Opinion: Before we rush to blame, we need to understand the challenges of Underway Replenishment.

News that USS Truxtun and USNS Supply collided during a Replenishment at Sea (UNREP/RAS) near South America has, predictably, triggered a wave of instant commentary. Much of it pointing fingers at “crew incompetence” before any investigation has even begun.

Two personnel were injured, thankfully only minor, and both ships have continued under their own power.

As someone who has stood at the con of a Supply‑class ship during an UNREP (perhaps the only 🇬🇧 to have done) I find the knee‑jerk criticism deeply disappointing and, frankly, uninformed, notwithstanding the well publicised challenges of the US Navy’s seamanship standards in recent years.

UNREP as 🇺🇸 prefer to call it is one of the most demanding evolutions at sea. It is not a casual manoeuvre. It is a controlled, high‑risk ballet performed by two moving steel structures, each displacing thousands of tonnes, connected by tensioned lines, hoses, and human coordination. Even in perfect conditions, the margin for error is slim.

Hydrodynamics don’t care about your plan or training. Bow cushion, suction, interaction; these forces change subtly & rapidly as ships close to 10s of metres of separation.

Even experienced bridge teams feel the ship “move under them” in ways simulators can’t fully replicate. Swell patterns, wind shifts, & currents can create asymmetrical forces that require constant, minute corrections. A half‑second of delay in response can translate into metres of lateral movement.

UNREP is a partnership. Both bridges must anticipate, communicate, and react in harmony. A single misjudged correction, on either side, can cascade quickly. Throw in the fatigue of lengthy deployments & these evolutions, in busy operational theatres, and under pressure to maintain readiness become a receipe for risk.

The assumption that a collision must equal incompetence betrays a lack of understanding of naval operations. The crews involved are trained, certified, drilled, and assessed relentlessly.

When something goes wrong, it is almost always because multiple factors aligned, not because someone “mucked up.”

Instead of defaulting to blame, as is so often the case, the professional conversation should focus on what opportunities to avoid recurrence can be leveraged from this incident.

Having been an exchange officer in a Supply‑class ship, I can say this with confidence: UNREP is one of the most technically demanding evolutions any mariner will ever execute and the men and women of the US Military Sealift Command are second only to the UK RFA in their skill at delivering it.

The trade of replenishing at sea requires precision, teamwork, and nerves of steel. Even when everything is done correctly, the sea can still surprise you. Supply class ships are powerful, big beasts, but they’re also ageing technology and sometimes things go wrong.

Let’s see what caused it, before we presume…

Two US Navy ships collide near South America https://lnkd.in/eGPfCnJp

A race to presumption?

Following the tragic loss of Air India Flight AI171 (VT-ANB), many in the aviation community have been quick to assume the worst — that the dual engine shutdown was a result of intentional pilot action. But in the rush to post expert takes, are we neglecting due process and deeper questions?

The AAIB India preliminary report clearly states both engine fuel control switches moved to CUTOFF within one second. But it stops short of attributing intent.

The accompanying cockpit audio captures one pilot asking: “Why did you cut off?” — met with a stunned denial. This is not the voice of malice; it’s the voice of confusion.

Yet commentary across LinkedIn, Twitter, and industry channels echoes one refrain in immediate response: “The pilot did it.”

What concerns us most is the eagerness of seasoned professionals — some with safety in their titles — to publicly declare intentionality, before root cause analysis is complete. This isn’t just speculative. It’s corrosive.

EASA SIB NM-18-33 (2018) already flagged the possibility of accidental disengagement of fuel control switches due to faulty or insecure locking mechanisms on the very same aircraft type. Its non-mandatory advisory status meant this known risk didn’t lead to structural changes or enforced inspections.

The AAIB report identifies no crew incapacitation, no CVR evidence of panic or sabotage — only the fact that two switches moved. So why are so many people leaping ahead of the evidence?

This incident should not become another case study in hindsight bias and “armchair CRM.” Speculating before final reports are released erodes public trust, diminishes investigative integrity, and places undue emotional pressure on the families and colleagues of those lost.

The focus now should be:

1. Investigating whether mechanical, ergonomic, or design factors made accidental switch movement possible

2. Revisiting the sufficiency of NM-18-33, given that its very concern may have materialised

3. Supporting a fact-driven, non-punitive approach to understanding how this disaster unfolded

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